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I. INTRODUCTION
0 N MAY 19, 1972, the State of Illinois filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the
city of Milwaukee, the Sewerage Commission of the city of Milwaukee, the
Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of Milwaukee County, and three other
Wisconsin municipal corporations.' The complaint charged that these Wis-
consin corporations were polluting Lake Michigan by dumping into its waters
raw or inadequately treated sewage from the sewage disposal system they
jointly operated which serviced the entire Milwaukee County area.' The
complaint, which sought injunctive relief to abate the pollution, was based
both on the law of Illinois,' and on the federal common law of public
nuisance.'
Five months later, on October 18, 1972, Congress enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.1 These Amendments
'The United States Supreme Court had previously declined to exercise the original juris-
diction over Illinois' complaint available under U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Instead, in a
unanimous decision, the Court remitted Illinois to the appropriate federal district court, having
found that Illinois had a federal common law nuisance claim cognizable in federal court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question). Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91
(1972).
2 Milwaukee County covers approximately 420 square miles with a population of over one
million. Its sewer system was both the "separated" and "combined" type, meaning that it
handled both sewage and storm water in the same conduits. The system had approximately
240 overflow or bypass points, and operated two sewage treatment facilities located on the
Lake Michigan shore within forty miles of Illinois. In wet weather, overflows occurred and
raw sewage was discharged along with storm water from the overflow points directly into
Lake Michigan or its tributaries. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 101 S. Ct.
1784, 1787-88 (1981).
a Illinois alleged a public nuisance under Illinois common law and a violation of the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 111 § 1001-07.1 (Smith-Hurd 1977
& Supp. 1981-1982).
'Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), established that the federal common
law of public nuisance applied to this case. See note 1 supra.
5 Pub. L No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (currently codified, as amended, in 33 U.S.C. IS
1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. I 1977, Supp. II 1978, Supp. 11 1979).
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restructured the Federal Water Pollution Control Act entirely,' and shifted
the focus of water pollution control from water quality standards to pol-
lutant discharge limitations.' The Amendments also established a permit
system to regulate pollutant discharges,' and made it illegal to empty
pollutants into navigable waters except pursuant to a valid permit.' Dis-
charge permits could be issued by the Environmental Protection Agency,
or by a state agency approved by the EPA."0 Other sections of the Amend-
ments authorized citizen's suits," and gave states authority to adopt more
stringent limitation standards than those imposed by the Amendments, or
established by EPA regulations. 2
Trial on Illinois' complaint finally began on January 11, 1977.18 Dur-
ing the pre-trial phase some of the defendant corporations had moved to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972 had preempted the federal common law
of public nuisance." The district court, after reviewing the legislative history,
found that "Congress in no way intended to destroy any remedies available
to the states prior to the passage of the 1972 amendments,"' 5 and denied
6 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as amended, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1151-1160 (1970), was completely replaced by the 1972 Amendments. For a
discussion of the 1972 Amendments and prior water pollution control legislation, see Mc-
Thenia, An Examination of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
30 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 195 (1973), and Smith, Highlights of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972, 77 DICK. L. REv. 459 (1973).
7 Water quality standards were to be set by each state with the approval of the Secretary
of the Interior. If the state failed to set standards, the Secretary was authorized to prescribe
criteria. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 10(c)(1) & (2), 79 Stat. 907-08(1965). (These provisions referred to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Responsibility was transferred to the Secretary of the Interior in Reorganization Plan 2
of 1966, § 1, 80 Stat. 1608 (1966)). These standards could be challenged by affected
states. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 10(c)(4)-(7), 79 Stat. 908-09(1965). The procedure created to enforce the water quality standards was rather cumber-
some. See Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, § 8, 70 Stat. 504-05(1956). The new permit system established by the Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 was much easier to enforce since the party either had a permit or it didn't,
and it was either complying with the permit or it wasn't. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 &
Supp. I 1977, Supp. II 1978, Supp. III 1979).
8The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, established by the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. I 1977, Supp.
II 1978, Supp. I1 1979), replaced a system administered by the EPA and the U.S. ArmyCorps of Engineers. See Exec. Order No. 11574, 3 C.F.R. 11574 (1970); Permits for
Discharges or Deposits Into Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R. 209.131 (1972).
9 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976).
10 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977, Supp. II 1978, Supp. III 1979).
11 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976). (The Court refers to § 1365 as § 505, which was its public law
section number).
1233 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976). (The Court refers to § 1370 as § 510, which was its public law
section number).
13 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 101 S. Ct. at 1789. All suits in equity seem
to be subject to Jarndyce's disease (endless delay)..See C. DICKENS, BLEaK HoUsE (Signet
ed. 1946).
14 Illinois ex rel. Scott v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
'Old. at 300. .
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the motion to dismiss the complaint.' The district court rendered a decision
against the defendant Wisconsin corporations on July 29, 1977. The district
court found that Illinois had proven the existence of a federal common law
public nuisance, and ordered the elimination of all sewage overflows in
addition to setting specific effluent limitations. 1 The city of Milwaukee,
the Sewerage Commission of the city of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan
Sewerage Commission of the county of Milwaukee appealed the district
court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit.' 8 During this appeal the question of whether the federal common law
had been preempted by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 was again raised." After reviewing and discussing the Amend-
ment provisions, the court of appeals, like the district court below, con-
cluded that the federal common law had not been preempted by the
Amendments." The city of Milwaukee and the two sewerage commissions
appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted their petition for
certiorari.1 In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan," the United
States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and
remanded the case,2 3 holding that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 had indeed displaced the federal common law action
authorized by the Court before the 1972 Amendments were enacted.'
The environmental law ramifications of this decision are significant. How-
ever, of greater significance is the Court's attempt in Milwaukee to efface
some of the uncertainty surrounding the federal common law, and to
elucidate the relationship between federal regulatory statutes and federal
common law."
1' ld. at 302.
17 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 101 S. Ct. at 1789. This relief ordered by
the federal court considerably exceeded the provisions of a Wisconsin state court's order
issued May 25, 1977, in connection with a suit brought to enforce provisions of the dis-
charge permits issued to the Milwaukee sewerage commission. See Illinois v. City of Mil-
waukee, 599 F.2d 151, 169-77 (7th Cir. 1979).
' Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
19The issue was raised, not by the defendant-appellant Wisconsin corporations, but in
amicus curiae briefs submitted by the United States and the State of Wisconsin. Since the
existence vel non of the federal common law concerned the federal court's jurisdiction to
hear the case, the court of appeals was obliged to decide the issue. Id. at 157.
2o ld. at 163.
21 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980).
-101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
2 Id. at 1800.
24 Id.
2 5 Deciding how the principles of the federal common law interlink with the intentions
expressed by. Congress in federal statutes is important because the answer affects not just
interstate water pollution cases, but also "every controversy in which schemes of federal
environmental legislation and regulation cut across fields of -common-law, such as land
use, energy, safety and air pollution." Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of Mid-America
Legal Foundation in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 4, -City of Milwaukee v. Illinois
and Michigan, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
Fall, 19811
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II. FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Although it has been the subject of much discussion by numerous
commentators," the federal common law has remained a nebulous entity.
As a viable legal doctrine the concept of a federal common law was intro-
duced in 1842 in Swift v. Tyson." The United States Supreme Court held
in Swift that a federal court exercising diversity of citizenship jurisdiction 8
could use its independent judgment and create common law to decide
matters not governed by a state statute.2 ' The federal courts followed the
rule of Swift v. Tyson in an unbroken line of decisions for almost one hun-
dred years." . Then, in 1938, came the well known decision of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins."1 In an opinion authored by Justice Brandeis, the Court held
Swift unconstitutional,32 and stated that the controlling law in any case was
the law of the state "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Consti-
tution or by Acts of Congress.""2 This was interpreted for the next few
years to mean that state law was the rule of decision in federal courts
unless the Constitution or a specific federal statute mandated the use of a
federal decisional rule." Thus, it appeared that the federal general common
law was dead.
However, the decision in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co., 5 decided the same day as Erie, and also authored by Justice Bran-
deis, indicated that federal common law in some form had survived Erie. Hin-
derlider involved apportionment of waters between two states, and the Court
declared such apportionment presented "a question of 'federal common law'
upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either state can be con-
clusive."3 Although this apparently contradicts the Erie decision, Hinderlider
actually falls into one of the exceptions mentioned in Erie: "matters governed
by the Federal Constitution.""
26 See, e.g., Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 383 (1964); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975); Morgan, The Future of a Federal Common Law,
17 ALA. L. REV. 10 (1964); Comment, Federal Judicial Law-Making Power: Competence
as a Function of Cognizable Federal Interests, 18 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REV. 171 (1976).
2741 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
2 Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, currently authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976),
was originally granted in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
2941 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19.
80 E.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1928); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910); Baltimore &
O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
81304 U.S. 64 (1938).
82 Id. at 79.
83 Id. at 78.
a4 See, e.g., Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); Ruhlin v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
85304 U.S. 92 (1938).
l6d. at 110 (footnotes omitted).
37304 U.S. at 78.
[Vol. 15:2
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The grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over suits in-
volving two states,"5 when coupled with the absence of congressional legis-
lation enacting rules of decision for these cases, compels the conclusion
that formulation of common law is required to allow just disposition of
these cases."9 Thus, federal common law appears to remain available to
govern disputes between states.
Similarly, the grant of jurisdiction over disputes to which a state
is a party"0 could support creation of federal common law to resolve
disputes between states and citizens of other states.,'
In 1942, four years after Erie," D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp." established that there need not be a federal
statute specifically prescribing a federal rule of decision before common law
could be created. Instead, authority to create a federal rule could be implied
from the policy expressed by a federal statute." Justice Jackson summarized
the decision in a concurring opinion, stating that:
Federal law is no juridical chameleon, changing complexion to match
that of each state wherein lawsuits happen to be commenced ....
Federal common law implements the federal constitution and statutes,
and is conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts are
free to apply the traditional common-law technique of decision and
to draw upon all the sources of the common law in cases such as the
present."5
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States" carried the rationale of D'Oench
even further. The suit involved the federal government's rights and duties
on its commercial paper. The Court found the statutes permitting issuance
of commercial paper, plus the federal regulations concerning commercial
38 U.S. CONST. art. II1, § 2.
"9 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94-98 (1907). See generally Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967);
Comment, The Invalid Growth of the New Federal Common Law Dictates the Need for a
Second Erie, 9 Hous. L. REV. 329 (1971); Comment, Federal Common Law and Article III:
A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325 (1964); Note, The Competence of
Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HAi-v. L. REV. 1084 (1964); Note, The
Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1512 (1969).
40 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
4 "Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-39 (1907) and Missouri v. Illinois,
200 U.S. 496, 520, 526 (1906) are cited by Justice Blackmun in his Milwaukee dissent
as cases demonstrating that the states have a "federal common law . . . right to be free
from unreasonable interference with [their] . . . environment . . when the interference
stems from another State or its citizens." 101 S. Ct. at 1801 (Blacknun, J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.).
-304 U.S. 64 (1938).
43315 U.S. 447 (1942).
-Id. at 457-58. Cf. Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 198 (1940) (using the policies and
purposes of a federal statute as grounds for the decision).
45 315 U.S. at 471-72 (footnote omitted).
46 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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paper, allowed a federal rule of decision."' Additionally, the Court found
that the application of state law would be adverse to the federal interests,
since applying the laws of the several states "would subject the rights and
duties of the United States [on its commercial paper] to exceptional un-
certainty." 8 The "desirability of a uniform rule" was thus clear. 9 So, where
there is both a need for a uniform rule to govern federal interests, and
no federal statute imposing standards for decision, federal common law may
be created.5"
Finally, Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills," and United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co.,5 2 provided for the use of federal common law to
fill the interstices of federal statutory schemes. In Lincoln Mills, a suit
brought to compel labor arbitration, the Court recognized that the key to
resolving some problems may lie within "the penumbra of express statutory
mandates," 2 and that federal courts could supply necessary rules of decision
"by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that
will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be de-
termined by the nature of the problem."5' Little Lake Misere, a land ac-
quisition case concerned with choice of law under a federal conservation
statute, supports Lincoln Mills, stating "the inevitable incompleteness pre-
sented by all legislation means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic
responsibility of the federal courts." 5
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee," also supports the creation of federal
common law to fill statutory interstices in order to effectuate federal policy.
In Illinois, after reviewing the current federal water pollution legislation, 7
the Court held that federal common law could provide a remedy not within
the precise scope of those prescribed by Congress, as a supplement to those
existing remedies. 8
So, it appears that federal common law can be made in a variety of
circumstances, yet the permissible scope of the rule of decision created
has not always been clearly delineated.
4 Id. at 366-67.
48Id. at 367.
49 Id.
5Old. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); National Metropoli-
tan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945).
51353 U.S. 448 (1957).
52412 U.S. 580 (1973).
5' 353 U.S. at 457.
54 Id.
55 412 U.S. at 593.
56406 U.S. 91 (1972).57 d. at 101-03.
58Id. at 103w See also Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). But cf. Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971). (The Court is "ill-equipped . . . to play
the role of fact finder," 401 U.S. at 498, and refusing to assume jurisdiction will not "disserve"
federal policies. 401 U.S. at 499).
[Vol. 15:2
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m. THE Milwaukee OPINIONS
Milwaukee is noteworthy because of the Court's attempt to explain
the relationship between the federal common law and federal statutes.
However, it is the dissent in Milwaukee that seems to present the better rea-
soned and more practical view of this relationship.
The majority regards law-making by the federal courts as an "unusual
exercise"" to be resorted to only where "Congress has not spoken to a par-
ticular issue" and federal policies conflict with state law.80 The majority also
states that the federal common law has always been recognized as "subject
to the paramount authority of Congress."61 The majority relies heavily on
Arizona v. California" and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham" to support
their contention that "when Congress addresses a question previously gov-
erned by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such ...
lawmaking by federal courts disappears."" Thus, in analyzing whether
federal common law has been displaced by statutes, the majority starts with
the presumption that "it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate
the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law,"6 and
then proceeds to assess the scope of the legislation to determine whether
Congress has addressed "the problem formerly governed by federal common
law."6 If it has, and there is nothing to rebut the presumption against ap-
plying the common law, then there is no room for judicial law-making.
Thus, the majority cites the comprehensive nature of the Amendments,'
reviews the legislative history, 8 and, finding nothing to indicate that the
common law has been preserved, declares that it has been entirely pre-
empted.6 9
The dissent in Milwaukee presents three compelling rationales for pre-
serving the common law. First, the dissent notes that the majority approach
"ignores this Court's frequent recognition that federal common law may
complement congressional action in the fulfillment of federal policies."7 As
the Court has previously mentioned, "[w]ere we bereft of the common law our
federal system would be impotent. This follows from the recognized futility
59 101 S. Ct. at 1791.
60 Id. at 1790.
61 Id. at 1790 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)).
-2373 U.S. 546 (1963).
63 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
64 101 S. Ct. 1791. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct.
1571, 1583 n.34 (1981).
65 101 S. Ct. at 1792.
6
etd. at 1791 n.8.
87 Id. at 1792-93.
68 Id. at 1798-1800.
69 Id. at 1800. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n.,
101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
701 01 S. Ct. at 1801 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Stevens, J.).
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of attempting all-complete statutory codes.. . ."I' Thus, the majority's total
preemption rationale seems impractical, and the common law should be
allowed to co-exist with and supplement the federal statutory scheme where
this proves to be necessary.
The dissent also points to the doctrine that "statutes will not be con-
strued in derogation of common law unless such an intent is clear."7 In
another case the Court stated:
a common-law right, even absent a savings clause, is not to be abro-
gated 'unless it be found that the preexisting right is so repugnant to
the statute that the survival of such right would in effect deprive the
subsequent statute of its efficacy; in other words, render its provisions
nugatory.'7
3
Here, there was a savings clause'4 in the Amendments which could have sup-
ported the preservation of federal common law.7" But, regardless, the better
view would seem to be that before totally preempting the common law,
there should be some indication that the statute compels this result."
Finally, the dissent tangentially discussed another applicable doctrine
of statutory construction.7" "[T]he construction of a statute by those charged
with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indica-
tions that it is wrong .. , 7 The United States filed an amicus curiae brief
supporting the existence of common law," and the EPA itself has used
federal common law to enforce water quality." Thus, in the absence of
indications in the statute that common law is entirely preempted, it would
seem reasonable to allow it to coexist with the statute.
71 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
72 101 S. Ct. at 1803, n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.) (cit-
ing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).
7 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 298 (1976) (quoting Texas & Pacific R.
Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907)).
74 "Nothing in this section shall restrict the right which any person . . . may have under
• . . common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek
any other relief." Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §
1365(e) (1976).
7- Nothing in the legislative history compels the conclusion that this clause precludes con-
sideration of the federal common law. See 101 S. Ct. at 1804-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting,joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.). See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act: Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference Committee,
October 4, 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in I LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATVE
HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 at 190-94 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79-82 (1971),
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 1497-1500 (1973); S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 145-46 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 328-29 (1973).
76 "A 'silently vocal' Congress is a high fiction .... ." Monaghan, supra note 26, at 16.
77 101 S. Ct. at 1807-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.).
78 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (footnotes omitted). See
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
79Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir. 1979).
8o 101 S. Ct. at 1807-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.).
(Vol..t15:2
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IV. CONCLUSION
Thus, the dissent presents a better view. If, after examining a statutory
provision and its legislative history, no compelling reason emerges to pre-
empt the common law, the potential benefits of allowing it to coexist with
the statute should compel its preservation.
DAvID E. MORRIS
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